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Life Value and Social Justice 
 
JEFFREY NOONAN  
Department of Philosophy, University of Windsor 
 
Since its publication in 1971, John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice has defined the terrain 
of political philosophical debate concerning the principles, scope, and material 
implications of social justice. Social justice for Rawls concerns the principles that 
govern the operation of major social institutions. Major social institutions structure 
the lives of citizens by regulating access to the resources and opportunities that the 
formulation and realization of human projects require. Rawls’ theory of social justice 
regards major institutions as just when they distribute what he calls “primary goods” 
in a manner that he regards as egalitarian. Hence, the subsequent social justice debate 
has been shaped by and large as a debate about the meaning and implications of 
egalitarianism. While on the surface a debate about egalitarianism as a distributional 
principle seems to uncover the core problem of social justice—how much of what 
everyone should get as a matter of right—the entire history of the debate has been 
conducted in abstraction from what matters most to people’s lives. It is as a 
corrective to such abstractions that the life-value approach to social justice has been 
developed.   
In this introduction I have three aims. First, I will substantiate the claim that the 
debate over social justice that has dominated political philosophy from Rawls until 
the present is abstracted from what ultimately matters. Second, I will provide a 
concise conceptual history of the development of life-value onto-axiology, defining 
its key terms and providing an overview of its importance for social justice. Finally, I 
will provide a brief discussion of the unifying principle of this special issue and each 
of the four papers that make it up.  
 
   
Primary Goods, Equality, and Life-Value 
 
I claimed above that the mainstream philosophical debate concerning social justice 
initiated by Rawls is abstracted from what matters most to humanity. In order to 
substantiate this claim it is necessary to begin with a discussion of Rawls’ theory 
itself. For Rawls social justice concerns the principles that regulate the way in which 
major social institutions distribute what he calls “primary goods.” Primary goods are 
“things that every rational man is presumed to want. These goods normally have a 
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use whatever a person’s plan of life. For simplicity’s sake, assume that the chief 
primary goods at the disposition of society are rights, liberties and opportunities, and 
wealth and income” (Rawls, 1999, p. 54). These are to be distributed according to 
two principles of social justice, and the principles interpreted according to the 
“difference principle.” The two principles of justice are: “Each person is to have 
equal rights to the most extensive share of equal liberties compatible with a similar 
scheme for others. Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and b) 
attached to positions and offices open to all” (Rawls, 1999, p. 53). The difference 
principle decisively affects the concrete application of these principles to the 
distributions of primary goods. It maintains that inequalities are permissible as 
incentives to the wealthy to act so as to ensure that the “economic process is more 
efficient, [and] innovation proceeds at a faster pace,” and, in general, becomes more 
productive, creating more wealth overall, and therefore a larger pool of resources for 
the poorer members of society (Rawls, 1999, p. 68).  
Widely assumed to be a depth critique of American capitalist society upon its 
publication, with some going so far as to believe it socialist, Rawls argument is still a 
touchstone of egalitarian critiques of the prevailing socio-economic system (Gutman, 
1999, p. 17). Nevertheless, a close investigation of its key terms reveals that it is 
neither critical nor egalitarian in a way that would make a material difference to the 
goodness of the lives of the least well off members of society. The crucial problem is 
that neither Rawls nor his most famous interlocutors in the debate ever question, or 
even define, the ruling money-value system of the global capitalist market. Instead, 
the legitimacy of this value system is presupposed, and debate confined to arguments 
over what amount of money should be redistributed from rich to poor, while the 
deeper problem of control over and use of life-sustaining and life-developing 
resources is never even broached.   
In illustration of this problem consider Rawls’ definition of primary goods. The 
problem with this definition encapsulates the problem of the subsequent debate. 
Quite simply, the problem with the definition is that it confuses goods that are 
primary values within the capitalist market system with goods that are primary 
values to human life. In liberal-capitalist society rights, liberties, and income appear 
primary, because they are the means by which the system reproduces and legitimates 
itself. Human life, by contrast, reproduces itself through collective labour in the 
natural field of life-support through which the resources our lives require are 
appropriated or produced. Different systems of collective labour are legitimate or not 
according to whether they enable everyone to satisfy their life requirements. Real 
primary goods are the resources, practices, institutions, and relationships that support 
and enable life-activity. Contra Rawls, therefore, primary goods are not relative to 
particular social systems, and it is not rational to want them in unlimited amounts, 
but only in those amounts sufficient for purposes of life-maintenance and 
development. Unlimited demand for life-requirements is materially irrational 
because appropriation of scarce life-goods at unsustainable levels undermines the 
very possibility of on-going life.  
Rather than capture that which is fundamental to social justice, Rawls confuses the 
system-values of a liberal-capitalist society with primary life-values, and normalizes 
the pathological demand for endless accumulation as “rational” regardless of the 
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actual extent of one’s own or others’ need. Instead of defining and explicating what 
is actually primary to embodied rational life—the resources, relationships, 
institutions, and practices which support life and enable the development of its vital 
capacities—Rawls assumes as primary the prevailing system-values, even though 
these are demonstrably destructive of the natural system of life-support and billions 
of peoples’ lives within different human societies. People’s lives are destroyed 
because the ecosystems they depend upon are destroyed or because they cannot 
afford to pay the money-price attached to commodified life-requirements. Yet, as his 
invocation of the difference principle proves, Rawls premises the possibility of social 
justice not on the spread of a commitment to egalitarianism in society, but to the 
unfettered growth of money-value—precisely the cause of the problem his theory is 
supposed to address.  
As I have noted, Rawls’ theory has not been uncontroversial and it has given rise 
to a host of sympathetic critiques. The best of those critiques, by Sen, Pogge, and 
Cohen focus on the ways in which Rawls ignores the question of what people are 
actually able to do and achieve, his failure to consider the problems of the global 
distribution of wealth, and the contradiction between his professed egalitarianism 
and the difference principle (Cohen, 1989, 2008; Pogge, 1989, 2008; Sen, 1992, 
1999, 2009). As important as these argument have been in exposing the complexity 
of the philosophical and political problems posed by the goal of equality, they too all 
fail to supply the key principle missing from the entire debate: precise specification 
of a criterion by which to distinguish the resources, relationships, institutions, and 
practices that justice demands people have access to, from the values that liberal-
capitalist society depends upon for its reproduction. This criterion can only be 
discovered if philosophy understands people not as atomic, self-maximizing 
consumers, as in classical liberalism and neo-classical economics, but as organically 
and socially interdependent members of natural fields of life-support and social 
fields of life-development.   
All are silent on this key issue because all begin from unquestioned acceptance of 
the prevailing value system as ultimate rather than the universal value system 
grounded in the natural and social systems of life-support and development. Life-
value onto-axiology, in contrast, distinguishes itself from existing value theories and 
social and political philosophies by uncovering and systematically explicating this 
real life-ground of value. It is from this life-ground of value, that the life-value 
theory of social justice derives, and its systematic explanation and application is the 
focus of this special issue of the journal. 
The life-ground of value, in the most general terms, is everything that is required 
for the survival and development of human and ecological life and their life-support 
systems. Subjectively, it is “the connection of life to life’s requirements as a felt 
bond of being” (McMurtry, 1998, p. 23). As is evident, the life-ground of value is 
deeper than the ruling value system of any society since it underlies the possibility 
and value of all life, not just human. It becomes relevant for theories of social justice 
as the objective basis by which goods which are of ultimate value because they are 
required for the maintenance and development of this life—as distinguished from 
system-values which allow a given social system to replicate and grow at the 
cumulative cost of human and planetary existence. That which the life-ground of 
value distinguishes as of ultimate value are life-requirements, or needs. Life-
requirements may be distinguished from consumer demands according to what 
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McMurtry has called the N-criterion: those resources, relationships, practices and 
institutions whose deprivation causes harm in the form of loss of organic life-
capacity. (McMurtry, 1998, p. 164). From this life-grounded standpoint social justice 
requires that the ruling value system of any society ensure the universal life-
necessities for all. 
While other attempts have been made to define needs and posit their satisfaction as 
the basis of social justice, none of them have formulated a precise criterion of need, 
nor, in the case of human needs, successfully integrated the natural and social 
dimensions of human existence, nor, most importantly, uncovered the deeper life-
ground within which human needs are anchored (See for example, Braybrooke, 
1987; Doyal & Gough, 1991; Hamilton, 2006; Lebowitz, 2010). The exemplary 
significance of life-value onto-axiology is thus not just that it supplies a criterion of 
need missing in other theories of social justice, but that it grounds social justice in 
universal life-needs and the capacities that they and only they enable. The 
comprehensive value theory undergirding the life-value understanding of social 
justice further supersedes the antitheses of nature and society, individual and 
community, life-requirements and life-capacities. 
This comprehensive value theory attains its fullest explication and defence in 
McMurtry’s “What is Good, What is Evil: The Value of all Values Across Times, 
Places, and Theories” in the Encyclopaedia of Life-Support Systems. (EOLSS) 
(McMurtry, 2010).  The EOLSS is the world’s most comprehensive encyclopaedia of 
disciplinary and technical knowledges and has evolved to provide all that is required 
for the maintenance and development of life across divisions. What McMurtry’s far-
reaching work shows inter alia is a blindness within philosophy to what is self-
evident once it has been uncovered: that life is both a presupposition of value (in the 
sense that creatures must be alive to experience or accomplish anything) and 
valuable in itself in the ranges of life enjoyed which can be more or less 
comprehensive. There are two essential forms of life-value: the instrumental or 
ultimate value of that which sustains and enables life, and the intrinsic value of the 
enjoyed expressions of the life-capacities of feeling, thought, and action (McMurtry, 
2010, p.74). Both are comprehended under the primary value axiom: X is of value if 
and only if and to the extent that x consists in or enables a more coherently inclusive 
range of thought/experience/action (2010, p.73). The qualifier “more coherently 
inclusive range” is essential to the success of life-value onto-axiology in overcoming 
the antitheses into which other theories fall. 
Theories of social justice which are not anchored in consciousness of the life-
ground of value tend to set the natural and social dimensions of human being at odds 
with each other, or see the relationship between human individuals and social 
organization as one of opposition and threat, or fail to properly explicate the organic 
relationship between life-requirement satisfaction and life-capacity development. 
Productivist interpretations of Marxism which link the achievement of social justice 
to the creation of a socialist society, and understand socialist society as removing the 
“fetters” on the growth of the productive forces are paradigm examples of the first 
problem. All social life depends upon the natural field of life-support, a fact ignored 
by Marxist theory to the extent that it treats nature and other life as nothing but raw 
material for the satisfaction of human needs understood as culturally appropriate 
levels of demand satisfaction. This problem has its roots in Marx’s own inability to 
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rigorously distinguish life-requirements from ever-growing consumer demands 
(Marx, 1973, p. 163). In life-value axiology, by contrast, life-valuable levels of 
social productivity are determined by the concrete principle of life-sufficiency: a just 
society does not seek unlimited material abundance but sufficiency of resources to 
the purpose of universal and comprehensive satisfaction of life-requirements.  
The second problem is exemplified in liberal theories of social justice which, 
because they assume individuals are atomic abstractions arrayed in competitive 
relations with others, cannot coherently reconcile individual goals and social 
institutions and regulating principles. Nussbaum’s version of the “capabilities 
approach” to social justice is a paradigm case. Nussbaum correctly understands 
human beings as both “capable and needy” and understands need satisfaction as 
instrumental to the expression and enjoyment of human capacities in a “flourishing 
life.” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 75). She nevertheless maintains that human beings are 
essentially separate from each other such that their primary concern is maintaining 
their “liberty.” From this doctrine of the separateness of persons she infers the 
practical conclusion that “economic needs should not be met by denying liberty” 
(2000, p. 12). For life-value onto-axiology the opposition between satisfying 
economic needs and denying liberties does not arise, because human beings are not 
considered as essentially separate from each other, but interrelated and 
interdependent within the natural and social fields of life-support and life-
development. Socially produced wealth is a collective creation of human beings 
labouring in a natural world they did not create. As a collective product, social 
wealth is properly understood as common wealth to be used for the sake of universal 
and comprehensive satisfaction of life-requirements. Individuality is enabled by each 
persons access to the universal life means and goods. In this view life-valuable 
liberty grows out of or emerges from this shared commitment to universal and 
comprehensive need-satisfaction. Liberty of a life-valuable form is thus never 
threatened by collective efforts to ensure life-requirements are satisfied, because 
liberty in any meaningful sense presupposes such satisfaction. The real threat to 
liberty in the life-valuable sense comes from the opposite direction: the private 
accumulation of money-wealth not serving anyone’s life-need and attained through 
life-blind economic processes.  
The final opposition which life-value onto-axiology resolves is between life-
requirement satisfaction and life-capacity development. Both liberal and socialist 
theories of social justice which concern themselves with life-requirement satisfaction 
do so in the name of some undefined conception of human flourishing or the 
realization of human potential. But neither liberal nor socialist theories have any 
means coherent with their premises of specifying limits to capacity realization. 
Liberals, fearful of charges of tyrannical limits to individual liberty, leave the 
direction of capacity realization entirely up to the arbitrary preferences of private 
individuals, or more deeply, the life-value indifferent system which leaves little 
choice for most people.  
Sen for example thus feels that social justice is an institutional arrangement which 
enables people to live in the ways they have “reason to value” without saying 
anything further about what those reasons are or the content of the values those 
reasons support (Sen, 1999, p. 87). His position is thus left open to the objection that 
not all lives that people have reason to value are good lives, either because the life 
contributes nothing good to the world or because it actively makes things worse for 
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others. Marxists too fall into a similar trap with loose and ungrounded talk about 
unlimited realization of potential. Michael Lebowitz, who has done much to defend a 
non-dogmatic humanist Marxism defends socialism on the basis of the claim that it 
enables the all-round development of human capacities, without noting that the all-
round development of human capacities does not coherently exclude their 
development in life-destructive ways (Lebowitz, 2010, p. 43). While it might seem 
obvious once disclosed, the point must nevertheless be explicitly made, that life-
valuable modes of capacity expression and enjoyment is distinct from full capacity 
realization, because the life-valuable forms are limited by considerations of the life-
interests of other creatures and human beings. Individual modes of capacity 
expression which worsen the natural and social fields without which no capacities at 
all can be expressed are objectively self-undermining. Life-grounded social justice 
therefore requires what McMurtry calls the life-coherence principle to establish the 
materially rational limits to individual and system demands. Hence social justice 
does not create the conditions for unlimited capacity expression, but capacity 
expression which enables planetary and human life as a whole (McMurtry, 2010, p. 
97).  
This “life-coherence principle” as the ultimate ruling value of a socially just 
society has not been easily won. It is the outcome of a philosophical struggle that 
McMurtry began 40 years ago through overland travels across over 80 countries in 
Africa, the Middle East and Asia. He was progressively moved to understand the 
depth reasons behind the impoverishment and deprivation of people’s lives that he 
observed in his journey. Initially, McMurtry sought for an understanding of those 
causes in Marxism. Yet, as he systematically worked through Marx’s texts, he 
became struck by the way in which considerations of life-need and life-capacity were 
increasingly displaced in favour of so-called “laws of motion” of capitalist society 
and the growth of the forces of production as the mechanical, and morally 
meaningless, driving force of historical development (McMurtry, 1978). The 
limitations of Marxism prompted McMurtry to reflect upon the broader history of 
philosophy, a history which he discovered was marked by silence about the ultimate 
problem of human life-organization: what serves life, what destroys life, and what 
the systemic social blockages to understanding this difference are (McMurtry, 1979, 
1981, 1988, 1989). The actual turn towards an explicit theorization of the life-ground 
of value, the real origin of life-value onto-axiology, did not occur until 1998 and the 
publication of Unequal Freedoms. From that point on he has elaborated it in two 
subsequent books, numerous journal articles, and, most comprehensively and 
importantly, in the Theme Essay for UNESCO’s Encyclopaedia of Life-Support 
Systems, “What is Good: What is Evil: The Value of all Values Across Times, 
Places, and Theories” (McMurtry, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2010). The articles collected in 
this special issue of Studies in Social Justice, including McMurtry’s comprehensive 
contribution, continue the process of elaborating and spelling out life-value onto-
axiology’s central importance to the solution of the most pressing theoretical and 
practical social and political problems in the contemporary world. 
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The Papers 
 
The collection begins with the lead essay by McMurtry.  This lead essay provides a 
brief historical account of the development of life-value onto-axiology for readers 
unfamiliar with it, develops clear explanations of its core concepts, and, most 
importantly, extends his previous work on human rights into constructing a 
systematic life-value understanding of social justice (McMurtry, 2011). Unlike the 
competing theories discussed above, the life-value theory of social justice begins 
from that which truly is primary: the natural and social requirements without which 
human life can neither survive nor develop. McMurtry’s article patiently works 
through the limitations of so-called “pro-life” advocacy both liberal theory and 
classical Marxism, but it reserves its most formidable critical energies to expose and 
combat the real enemy of social justice: the underlying money-value regime of the 
“global corporate rights system.” Internalized as the unquestioned and 
unquestionable value paradigm governing public and private behaviour, it mandates 
as “good” the instrumentalization of all that exists as means for the maximal 
production and accumulation of money-value for corporate entities (with a definitive 
criterial account of what a “corporation” exactly is in law and practice). Richly 
illustrated with real-world examples, McMurtry’s contribution lays bare the 
systematic threat absolutist corporate rights pose to the world, but also, and more 
importantly, the underlying life-value alternative of society’s organizing rights. This 
alternative is not based on theoretical abstraction but on our real life-ground that 
includes the air we breathe, the water and land we live from and the public, civil 
commons institutions we have built.  
The subsequent three essays apply the key concepts of life-value onto-axiology to 
important practical dimensions of social justice—the food system, education, and 
human rights in international law. Three of the authors: Jennifer Sumner, Howard 
Woodhouse, and Giorgio Baruchello, are leading figures in the development and 
explication of the theory and practice of life-grounded social justice. The fourth 
author, Rachael Lorna Johnstone lends her expertise in international law in a 
collaborative effort to bring life-value onto-axiology to bear on the legal side of 
human rights theory and practice. All, with the exception of Johnstone, have 
published widely on core aspects of life-value philosophy previously (Baruchello, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010; Sumner, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010; 
Woodhouse, 2001, 2001a, 2003, 2003a, 2005, 2009, forthcoming). The first two 
papers argue that advancing the cause of social justice requires that the food system 
and the educational system become civil commons institutions. As civil commons 
institutions they would be governed by the goal of universal provision and protection 
of life-requirements and life-standards. In each case their life-value as civil commons 
institutions is threatened by privatization and instrumentalization by the ruling 
money-value system. In the third paper, Baruchello works for the first time with 
international human rights expert Rachael Lorna Johnstone in a first foray to link 
together the concepts of (life) value and (human) rights, demonstrating that 
international law already has a language for life-value and that a nuanced 
appreciation of the latter concept amongst human rights specialists can bring about a 
more effective interpretation and implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  
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Sumner’s essay continues her important work on the global food system. Her 
paper asks what a socially just food system would look like. As she demonstrates, 
the present global food system treats food as a commodity and its value as the 
money-profit returns it generates, primarily for large corporate agribusinesses.  This 
corporate food system is indifferent to the nutritional value of the food it produces, to 
whether people can afford to pay for its food-commodities, and the life-conditions of 
farmers and farm workers which produce for it. Since all who require nutritious food 
cannot access it under the ruling corporate food-commodity system, it cannot be 
socially just. Social justice from the life-value perspective demands the 
comprehensive satisfaction of universal life-requirements for the sake of people’s 
wider and deeper expression and enjoyment of their life-capacities. Hence, a socially 
just food system, Sumner concludes, must be grounded in local control over arable 
lands, crops, and distribution systems and be governed by the overriding goal of 
sustainable provision of nutritious and healthy food as what each and all of their 
lives require. In other words, social justice demands that the food system function as 
a civil commons institution in which people are brought together in a spirit of 
cooperation and organized, shared commitment to the goal of ensuring the universal 
satisfaction of our basic need for healthy food. 
As essential as our need for healthy food is, our human nature is not realized by its 
provision alone. Human nature is integrally natural and social. As food and water are 
to our body, so is education to our mind: the fundamental condition of its health and 
development. Education is the most fundamental socio-cultural institutional 
requirement for the development of the cognitive and imaginative capacities that are 
the foundation for all humanly creative activity. In his paper Woodhouse defends the 
life-value of education as a civil commons institution, exposing the threat posed to it 
by the subjugation of higher education to corporate-market values. Woodhouse does 
not simply defend philosophical claims in the abstract, but makes his case through a 
discussion of an attempt to realize life-value principles of social justice by higher 
education outside of administration control. Woodhouse’s essay examines the efforts 
of academics and community members to build the “People’s Free University of 
Saskatchewan” as an alternative to the increasingly corporatized agenda of the 
University of Saskatchewan. His paper illustrates the ways in which civil commons 
institutions bind people together in pursuit of their shared life-interests, but also the 
difficulties the attempt to extend the logic of the civil commons—unpriced provision 
of necessary life-goods and services—faces in the concrete social conditions which 
currently prevail.  
One fundamental reason why it is so difficult to extend the logic of civil commons 
provision, even when it is clear to everyone that this logic is not only morally sound, 
but practically superior to market models of production and distribution, is because 
the typical interpretation of rights upon which the public morality of liberal-
capitalism rests assumes that all collective action, from above or below, 
compromises individual freedom. Nevertheless, picking up on a theme from 
McMurtry, Baruchello and Johnstone examine the nature and implications of 
international human rights law, in particular the ICESCR and interpret it from a life-
value perspective. This binding treaty includes, amongst others, clearly defined 
rights to “adequate food” (substantively more than a right “not to be hungry”) and 
“education… directed to the full development of the human personality” (ICESCR, 
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articles 11 and 13), the themes addressed by Sumner and Woodhouse. What the 
authors find is a comprehensive set of life-necessities recognized in international law 
and endorsed by no less than 160 of 192 United Nations member states, including the 
liberal economies of the entire European area and Canada. Nonetheless, the authors 
recognize that these rights are not universally enjoyed in practice and examine the 
competing conceptions of value that hinder their fulfilment, not least the political 
ambivalence towards any substantial redistribution of resources, which shields itself 
behind a competing “right” to private property, a right that is not itself protected in 
either of the principal international human rights treaties, the ICECSR or the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The paper, written in light of 
the austerity packages sweeping the developed world, thus emphasizes the potential 
for protection of the life-ground that is offered by international human rights law, 
even as conceived of as consisting of individual entitlements. Moreover, they argue 
that McMurtry’s life-value framework provides a coherent model to evaluate state 
performance under the treaty.  
Together these four papers provide a systematic account of social justice from the 
life-grounded standpoint. The importance of the life-value perspective grows in 
proportion to the severity of life-crises our world faces. These life-crises affect the 
natural conditions of planetary life in general, and the social, political, economic, and 
cultural conditions of good human lives in particular. The papers printed herein 
provide the theoretical and conceptual resources needed to understand the depth 
causes of these crises, and the practical tools which any efficacious solutions will 
require. 
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